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The complexity of the security environment confronts us constantly with important dilemmas 
about the effectiveness of our risk management operations. The global security environment is 
becoming more complex than ever before. In addition to traditional national and international 
actors, who have had a major impact on the regulation of geo-political relationships in the inter-
national security environment until recently, non-state entities have been arriving on the scene. 
They	have	gained	special	importance	in	terrorism,	one	of	the	most	significant	security	threats	at	
the beginning of the 21st century, and present a threat to undisturbed functioning of the wider 
social community. However, terrorism has not been the only serious security risk recently. We 
have witnessed a whole range of complex security threats posed by constant migration pressure 
to the external EU borders and, consequently, the adoption of more restrictive border measures 
at the Schengen border, as well as cyber risks and large-scale hacker attacks, a wide range of 
risks facing commercial organizations, coronavirus pandemic,  and geopolitical shifts we ex-
perience almost daily and present us with the constantly changing dynamic of a stable security 
environment we were accustomed to in the past. Because of all this, the professional public is 
confronting dilemmas about seeking appropriate responses to the changed security trends.
However, an in-depth analysis of risk factors facing democratic societies in Europe quickly 
reveals that threats are not only linked to external factors, but are, particularly major ones, 
also	found	within	democratic	social	communities	 themselves.	Even	a	superficial	analysis	of	
terrorist acts committed over the last 15 years in Europe shows that most acts were carried out 
by citizens of European countries, who had, on the basis of their political, religious and other 
views, radicalized to the extent that they were prepared to enforce their views by committing 
terrorist acts. In addition to casualties, which were certainly a tragic product of these processes, 
Western democratic societies were shaken by the realization that, sociologically speaking, they 
were left without any suitable answers about to how it was possible for individuals in such 
environments to become so radicalized as to be willing to risk their own lives and harm fel-
low citizens on account of their beliefs. The approach taken after 11 September 2001, when 
excessive attention was focused on strengthening security mechanisms in the intelligence and 
security	field,	indicated	with	every	subsequent	terrorist	act	that	these	measures	were	ineffec-
tive	in	and	of	themselves,	and	failed	to	produce	desired	results	in	relation	to	financial	and	other	
resources used. Sociological processes taking place in democratic societies which are increas-
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ingly	reflected	in	the	marginalization	of	certain	social	groups,	 increased	stratification	and,	 in	
some cases, segregation, and consumerism as a value which has superseded all other values 
and alienated individuals of the community, are only a few of the negative factors directly con-
tributing to a favorable environment for radicalization. Our societies will have to change their 
awareness of the importance of appropriate coordination for the effectiveness of the system of 
countering terrorism. All of the above factors and challenges gain an additional dimension and 
importance when seen through the prism of the regional perspective of terrorism suppression. In 
the	field	of	preventing	radicalization	and	extremism,	a	specific	role	has	now	moved	to	the	insti-
tutions of the society which were formerly not directly regarded as active actors of countering 
terrorism. The educational system, social services, religious communities, non-governmental 
organizations and a whole range of civil society movements have become crucial in the process 
of perceiving radicalization factors in individual persons. All these segments of society must, 
together with national security authorities, form a comprehensive and an effectively functioning 
system	of	identification	and	prevention	of	processes	that	lead	to	extremism	and	radicalization	
of individuals or groups. 
When the informatization and digitalization of society are added to the discourse, it can be 
stated with certainty that the functioning of society, in addition to other problems, has become 
heavily dependent on new technological solutions. On the one hand, they enable the virtuality 
of interpersonal relationships which is based on the internet and all existing social networks. 
On the other hand, technical solutions are one of the means enabling radicalization processes in 
groups and individuals. The functioning of a modern society also requires the provision of basic 
infrastructural	capabilities,	which	are	defined	as	critical	infrastructure.	They	are	divided	into	a	
range of sub-sectors, of which the provision of electricity and information and communication 
technologies are of central importance, since their co-dependent functioning affects all other 
sub-sectors	and	has	a	special	significance	for	the	functioning	of	a	wider	social	community.	This	
is the reason why the cyber security has important role in protection of critical infrastructure.
If modern security threats posed by international terrorism and associated radicalization of in-
dividuals	or	groups	are	indeed	as	complex	as	content	of	this	publication	describes,	it	is	justified	
to ask several questions, such as: what can a modern state do for its national security system to 
respond quickly and effectively to terrorist threats; how should the national counter-terrorism 
system be structured; what roles and powers do security authorities of individual states have 
within this system; and, especially, are security and other state institutions appropriately organi-
zationally structured, prepared and equipped to be capable of carrying out the activities of coun-
tering threats, such as terrorism. Without a stable and well-functioning system of public-private 
partnership, whose processes include corporate security of organizations managing critical in-
frastructure,	it	will	be	very	difficult	to	prevent	radicalization	processes	in	these	organizational	
environments.
The	aim	of	this	publication	is	to	find	answers	to	some	of	the	above	questions.	The	combination	
of different approaches, concepts and analyses of different cases, as well as the role of national 
security	entities	in	countering	terrorism,	provide	specific	solutions	to	the	majority	of	the	issues	
including cyber security and critical infrastructure protection, which, however, does not exclude 
further	scientific	and	professional	considerations.		
 Ljubljana, September 2020
	 Denis	Čaleta,	PhD
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Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on American soil, the US Government transformed 
the existing 1960’s emergency management protocols and created a new methodology for 
thinking	like	our	adversaries—what	assets	(targets)	are	critical	and	likely	to	influence	or	
damage national political objectives and thus cause psychological fear and embarrassment. 
Physical	barriers	to	protect	critical	infrastructures	are	not	only	expensive,	but	also	flawed.	
Never	will	 any	 public-	 or	 private-sector	 owner	 of	 critical	 infrastructure	 have	 sufficient	
resources to protect every designated site. The focus on protection from external physical 
intrusions should now shift to internal cyber protection measures—personnel surety and 
Red Teaming.
A post-9/11 Approach: Empowered with a plethora of legislation, President George W. 
Bush issued a series of executive orders and directives to frame how America would pro-
ceed in identifying and protecting America’s critical infrastructures. His vision was clear, 
succinct and unambiguous: Focus not only on potential terrorist attacks, but rather on any 
hazard that might damage, destroy or otherwise incapacitate America’s critical infrastruc-
tures. The Rationale: regardless of the cause of incapacitation, the consequences will be 
the same.
Bush’s vision resulted in today’s All-Hazards Approach—terrorist attacks, major disasters, 
and other emergencies. This approach leads planners to consider myriad factors—designat-
ing and grouping infrastructures by sector, historical analysis of the most-likely scenarios 
impacting infrastructures, emerging intelligence threats, available resources, prioritization 
of infrastructures, ownership (public- and private-sector) of infrastructures, criticality cri-
teria, stakeholders associated with infrastructures, existing vulnerabilities of infrastruc-
tures, consequences associated with damage or destruction of infrastructures, available 
resources and overall risk management. The Intent: apply the available resources to the 
most-likely threat.
The result of this approach produced the US National Infrastructure Protection Plan. The 
current plan (2013) designates 16 sectors; the Information Technology Sector is orchestrat-
ed	by	the	Department	of	Homeland	Security.	For	cyber-specific	issues,	the	newly	created	
James F. Powers Jr.
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(2018) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency has responsibility to coordinate 
efforts from the federal government level to the local level—and includes owners/operators 
and all stakeholders.
Since	sufficient	resources	to	physically	protect	critical	infrastructures	will	never	be	availa-
ble, the imperative to ensure due diligence in appropriating federal, state, local and private-
sector funds for protection efforts is paramount. Today’s protection efforts are multidimen-
sional—not simply armed guards and barriers protecting a building or system. Protection 
efforts are characterized and prioritized by human, physical & cyber considerations; the 
National Planning Scenarios; determination of criticality; intelligence; and risk (stated as a 
function of threats, vulnerabilities and consequences). Moreover, it is a dynamic rather than 
a passive process—what is critical today may not be critical tomorrow. And intelligence 
informs all stakeholders of emerging concerns. The factors and considerations previously-
mentioned are interlinked like a watchwork. When one factor changes, the others are im-
pacted to some degree.
Considering what practitioners have learned since 9/11, here’s where the focus should be:
1. Historically-based (national planning scenarios) versus crime-related (this includes ter-
rorism) threats. For example, cyber-systems are much more vulnerable to weather and natu-
ral disasters than to terrorist threats.
2. Monitoring of cyber intrusion attempts and determining origin for possible prosecution.
3. Developing threat-based cyber capabilities to detect, deter, mitigate, respond to and re-
cover from cyber intrusions
4. Investing in personnel surety versus software. Aside from personnel costs, the second 
largest expenditure for most companies is information technology. It’s time to re-evaluate 
the expenditures for physical protection versus the costs required for personal surety. Why? 
It’s easier to gain access to a cyber system via someone on the inside than hire a cyberhacker 
to break into the system. Background checks must become more comprehensive—and this 
may	include	periodic	and	unannounced	polygraph	tests,	drug	testing,	and	personal	financial	
reviews. The weakness of any cyber system lies not in the software, but in the integrity of 
those operating the system. Owners/operators of CI should establish Red Teams—teams of 
company-owned, experienced cyberhackers—whose sole mission is to hack into the com-
pany’s systems. The intent here is to hire better hackers than the adversary.
Nation-states will forever endure extremist and radical ideologies—and these labels are all 
culture-based. Disagreement in beliefs and ideologies does not necessarily constitute crimi-
nal motivation or likelihood of criminal behavior. When actions of any group—ideology 
notwithstanding—become violent and break the laws of that sovereign nation-state, then 
those acts, however, constitute criminal behavior.
It	is	unlikely	that	any	nation-state	permits	identification	theft,	cyber	hacking,	cyber	intru-
sions, etc. Whether these violations are considered as violent is a matter for the particular 
nation-state. Many Americans do not consider cybercrime violent but rather something less 
than violent—a white collar crime—but a crime, nonetheless.
As threats increase, so should protection efforts. And the greater the assets, the greater the 
need for cybersecurity systems. The very nature of being designated critical usually infers 
that the site has vast assets—and an information technology system to help facilitate opera-
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tions. Thus, the larger and more critical the asset, the likely degree of dependence on infor-
mation technology—and thus the greater degree of risk from cyber-hackers.
The three protection priorities—human, physical and cyber—can be dealt with individually 
to identify and reduce vulnerabilities and consequences. Physical measures such as barri-
ers, ballistic curtains, bollards, armed guards, etc. are easy, albeit expensive methods for 
protecting human and physical assets. However, cyber protection has as many solutions as 
the number of experts discussing it.
Since 9/11 and the ever-expanding capabilities of today’s cyber world, damage and destruc-
tion efforts are focusing more on cyber-attacks than physical attacks—particularly if the 
site depends on and shares data with a large number of stakeholders. What this portends for 
owners and stakeholders is a more internal versus external focus on protection—the per-
sonnel having access to the cyber systems that support and facilitate day-to-day operations. 
Respect the capabilities of potential adversaries. Strengthen personal surety and Red Team 
systems—physical measures are limited.
 Tampa, September 2020
 James F. Powers Jr.
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4	Historical	and	Legal	Aspects	of	Cyber	
Attacks	on	Critical	Infrastructure
Andrej Iliev, Ferdinand Odzakov
1 Introduction
With continued evolution of technology, the opportunities and challenges from cyber domain 
are rising. We are at a crossroads, as we move from a society already entwined with the 
internet to the coming age of automation and Internet of Things. In our everyday lives we can 
see that societies around the world more depend on modern technology, the ability to shut 
down or destroy critical infrastructure and to take control of machines and vehicles, directly 
causes economic losses to become a reality. 
An analysis of the history of well-known examples of cyberattacks on critical infrastructure 
includes the following:
• In 2008 Russia sent tanks into Georgia, coinciding with a cyber attack on the Georgian 
government’s	computing	infrastructure.	This	is	thought	to	be	one	of	the	first	coordinated	
land and cyber attacks (Cyber Security Trends 2016);
• Also in 2008, Stuxnet – a computer worm purportedly jointly designed by Israel  crippled 
Iran’s nuclear-enrichment programme by sabotaging centrifuges;
• In 2014, a German steelworks was disabled and a furnace severely damaged when hackers 
infiltrated	its	networks	and	prevented	the	furnace	from	shutting	down;
• In 2015, in an attack which was strongly suspected to have originated in Russia, 230,000 
people lost power when 30 sub-stations in Western Ukraine were shut down via a remote 
attack. Operators at the control centre were even locked out of their systems during the 
attack, and could only watch it unfold (Coldwell, 2016).
In all of these, as an indication of how the landscape of war is changing, the weapon of choice 
wasn’t guns or bombs – it was a keyboard. We can expect governments around the world to 
strengthen their cyberattack and defence capabilities, spurring an arms race that will operate 
at a much faster pace than we saw in the Cold War. But the results could be much more 
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subtle as to improve governments’ intelligence-gathering capabilities and develop ability to 
surreptitiously	manipulate	markets,	and	they	will	continue	to	expand	the	definition	and	rules	
of engagement for cyberattacks.
The term “cyber attack”	was	first	 presented	 by	 author	William	Gibson	 in	 1982,	when	 he	
wrote his book “Neuromance”. This book become very popular because it manages to 
explain today’s virtual reality and network information activity to readers in a practical and 
constructive	way.	William	Gibson	defined	“cyberspace” in a very simple way as a constructed 
virtual environment in which information or computer systems and networks have a dominant 
or primary role (Wall, 2007: pp.221-223).
The term “cybercrime” further symbolizes the security threats that come from the internet, 
actually through information and communication networks and systems. These security 
threats from the virtual information environment represent a breach of computer security. As 
we	must	legally	define	the	term	“security	of	computer”	or	“information	systems”,	then	the	
term “cybercrime” falls within the scope of criminal law. Cyber  warfare, as a new model of 
proxy war, represents the future of modern warfare. 
“Proxy” means giving someone authority to do something for another.  For example: Small 
states uses proxy strategy to attack their stronger enemy, because they have comprehensive 
support from bigger state. States use proxies to project power through cyberspace, some 
capable	of	 causing	 significant	harm.	 In	 recent	years,	media	outlets	have	published	 reports	
about proxies using Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) from Northeast 
Asia to India, Pakistan, Middle East, and Eastern Europe (Maurer, 2016: pp 383-384).
The continual development of modern computer systems and networks means that they 
represent a continual proxy strategy for conducting modern cyber attacks. The high level of 
autonomy of computer systems and networks enables them to build an effective proxy warfare 
strategy in which the performer of this information operations is always at an advantage over 
the attacked side. On the other hand, implementing a proxy strategy of warfare over computer 
networks is a much simpler method than using sophisticated weaponry to perform the most 
advanced military operations. Vast classical armies are no longer an integral part of proxy 
warfare, the continued development of information technology is a necessity for executing a 
proxy strategy in cyber warfare, which as a mode of combat is increasingly a major segment 
of	modern	conflict,	such	as	hybrid	and	comprehensive	or	compound	warfare.
Attacks on critical infrastructure most often include: public gatherings, hospitals, shopping 
malls, infrastructures of strategic importance to national security, airports and other strategic 
facilities of the state, and through the vulnerability of their information and communication 
networks, the enemy can achieve a far more effective attack than by using large armed forces 
in which casualties could be numerous. In cyber warfare, where there is no use of military 
force, the attacker does not have casualties.
The Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) estimated that between May 2006 
and	June	2011	there	were	almost	eighty	“significant	cyber	incidents”	that	resulted	in
”successful attacks on government agencies, defence and high tech companies or economic 
crimes with losses of a few million dollars” (Hopkins, 2012).
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With	a	final	goal	of	reprogramming	industrial	control	systems,	Stuxnet	was	a	large,	complex	
piece of malware with many different components and functionalities, a threat that was primarily 
written to target an industrial control system or set of similar systems. Industrial control systems 
are used in gas pipelines and power plants. In order to achieve this goal the creators amassed a 
vast array of components to increase their chances of success. Stuxnet was a threat targeting a 
specific	industrial	control	system	like	that	of	Iran,	its	ultimate	goal	was	to	sabotage	a	facility	by	
reprogramming programmable logic controllers (PLCs) to operate as the attackers intend them 
to,	most	likely	out	of	their	specified	boundaries	(Falliere,	et	al.,	2010:	pp.	1-3).
In general, cyber-attacks can be separated into three major categories: (I) “automated malicious 
software” delivered over the internet, (II) “denial-of-service attacks” and (III) “unauthorized 
remote intrusions into computer systems”. (Sklerov, 2009).
2 Historical Evolution of Cyber-Attacks on Critical 
Infrastructure
Critical infrastructure is vulnerable to all type of attacks, and increasingly to attacks 
committed through the internet. Cyber threats to critical infrastructure (CI) are an evolving 
security challenge that can impact global security, public safety and the economy in general. 
As the private sector owns and operates most of the (CI) assets networks, and governments are 
responsible for national security, securing (CI) against cyber threats is a shared responsibility 
of both the public and private sectors (H2020 700416, project, “Securing Critical Energy 
Infrastructures,” http://www.successenergy.eu/).
The	first	period	of	the	historical	development	of	cyberattacks	encompasses	the	technological	
development of information technology from the early 1980s to the end of the Cold War in 
the early 1990s. Here we will try to highlight the most important examples of cyber attacks 
and cyber operations during this decade. During 1982, then US President Ronald Reagan 
approved	 a	 “state	 secret”	 plan	 for	 the	 use	 of	 specific	 software	 capable	 of	 controlling	 gas	
supply pumps and their turbines in industrial gas production and distribution facilities in the 
former Soviet Union. Fortunately or unfortunately, this software was stolen by secret Russian 
agents	during	their	stay	in	Canada.	The	software	was	able	to	change	the	flow	rate	of	the	gas	
pumps and thereby succeeded in causing them to malfunction. Former US Air Force Secretary 
and	 former	Director	of	 the	National	Reconnaissance	Office,	Thomas	C.	Reed,	 in	his	book	
“At the Abyss: An Insider’s History of the Cold War,” said that the psychological effect  of 
this	software	and	the	effect	on	the	Soviet	Union’s	economic	capacities,	significantly	speed	up	
the process of ending the Cold War.  US used cyber warfare during Iraq’s invasion in 1991 
(Hoffman, 2004). During Operation Desert Storm, a strategic air campaign was launched 
against Iraq’s air defences, so that the command and control telecommunications information 
system was attacked by advanced computer software, causing electrical disruptions in Iraq’s 
telecommunications information system (Operation Desert Storm,1997, Appendix V).
The second period of the development of cyber attacks is the next decade, from 1990 to the 
9/11 terrorist attacks on the US in 2001. A virtual online war broke out between Chechens 
and pro-Russian forces in 1994. This virtual war on the internet simulated military operations 
which	one	or	other	party	wanted	to	carry	out	in	the	field	in	a	real	sense.	This	sophisticated	
widespread action of internet psychological propaganda is known as psychological surgery.
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Finally, it was found that the psychological operations were expressed through web portals 
and online simulations as a segment of cyber warfare which was funded through bank funds 
in Sacramento, California, which greatly helped to unite the Chechen Diasporas to end this 
cyber war as soon as possible (Thomas, 2002).
During the Second Russo-Chechen Cyber  War from 1997-2001, numerous military records 
of assassinations of Chechen and Russian soldiers mounted on both sides appeared on the 
internet	and	official	Russian	and	Chechen	web	portals.	
The Russian authorities, on the other hand, conducted cyber attacks by hacking Chechen web-
sites. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), with the Russian Special Forces ”Spetsnaz”, 
were responsible for preventing two Chechen web portals from operating (Bullough, 2002). 
This was internet psychological propaganda between the nations. What we can conclude, is 
that the Chechens’ internet propaganda proved more successful. Digital videos and pictures of 
how a civilian Chechen bus was attacked by pro-Russian separatists with many of the passen-
gers killed, and the activities in ambushes by Chechen militias on Russian military convoys, 
are just some of the propaganda material on internet web portals during 1999, which were 
officially	denied	by	Russia.	
The	Kosovo	crisis	of	1999	is	considered	to	be	one	of	the	first	more	sophisticated	information	
wars.  NATO prepared to carry out its air campaign in Serbia by bombing critical infrastruc-
ture targets in order to bring the country into collapse, thereby forcing Serbia to withdraw 
from Kosovo. Numerous hacker groups emerged, notably the “Black Hand”, which launched 
serious	cyber	attacks	on	NATO’s	official	and	secret	internet	infrastructure.	Unfortunately,	al-
though	it	cannot	be	confirmed	with	certainty,	it	is	assumed	that	some	of	the	hackers	were	from	
the Yugoslav Army. Their goal was more than clear to disable the NATO air military opera-
tions on critical infrastructure in Serbia. It is also assumed that the NATO missile incident at 
the	Chinese	Embassy	in	Belgrade	was	definitely	the	work	of	Serbian	hackers,	who	managed	
to	change	the	missile’s	flight,	coordinates	from	its	launch	to	the	target	(Bosnian	Serb	News	
Agency, 1999).
During September 2000, young Israeli hackers were able to hack into several Hezbollah and 
Hamas websites in Lebanon. The hackers attacked the operating systems of web portals and 
successfully penetrated and gave fake news through six web portals to: Hezbollah, Hamas and 
other organizations in Lebanon, as well as the Palestinian national authorities. This seemingly 
minor cyber attack escalated into an international incident. The Palestinian and other Islamic 
organizations called it”a holy cyber war” (The Associated Press, 2000). The hackers carried 
out cyber attacks against 3 high-ranking Israeli websites belonging to the Israeli Parliament, 
the Foreign Ministry and the Israeli Defence Forces. Later, they also launched a cyber attack 
on	the	office	of	the	Israeli	Prime	Minister,	the	Bank	of	Israel	and	the	Tel	Aviv	Stock	Exchange.	
By	January	2001,	 the	cyber	conflict	had	affected	more	 than	160	Israeli	and	35	Palestinian	
major web portals. 
About 548 domains of Israeli websites were hacked in the Middle East. The most common 
cyber attacks were websites malfunctions and operating system attacks. Cyber  attacks on tel-
ecommunication companies were also carried out. Palestinian hackers succeeded in destroy-
ing Israel’s Net Vision, which supplied about 70% of the national internet communications.
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The third and last historical period of cyber warfare begins after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on 
the	United	States	in	2001.	The	first	significant	cyber-attack	in	this	third	period	was	in	Estonia	
in 2007. Estonia, a small country with a population of just over 1.3 million, had a boom in 
the use of internet technology in a very short period of time. Similarly to many advanced 
countries in the implementation of internet technology, the Estonian government made the 
whole of Estonia a virtual domain in November 2005.  Meetings at the highest national 
level, and other business meetings were conducted online, through the virtual domain, as 
well as documents signed with electronic signatures and Estonian citizens were able to vote 
electronically through their computers. 
Estonia was ranked 23rd in readiness and implementation of advanced information technology. 
Over 60% of the population had electronic bank accounts, while 95% of bank transactions were 
made electronically. All of this was tempting to the interests of numerous hackers wanting to 
test the Estonian cyber defences (Farivar, 2007). On 27 April 2007, the Estonian government 
relocated a monument to the victims of the Soviet Armed Forces’ liberation of Estonia from 
the fascist regime during World War II. This simple act of moving the monument from the 
centre of Estonian capital, Tallinn, outside the city, sparked in protests and clashes between 
Estonians and Russians. The protests were followed, by numerous cyber-attacks from Russian 
hackers	targeting	the	operating	systems	of	national	and	private	firms	and	enterprises.	During	
the	cyber	attacks	the	Estonian	government’s	website,	had	a	normal	flow	of	1000	emails	per	
day and spam messages of 2,000 per second. The government network was designed to handle 
2	million	megabits	per	second	and	the	servers	were	flooded	with	nearly	200	million	megabits	
per second during the cyber attacks. The longest attack lasted over 10 hours and generated 
over 90 million megabytes of data per second. Because of this, the websites of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Justice were shut down until the cyber attacks on websites could be 
neutralized and normal service restored. The banks in Estonia were closed, which in addition 
to	the	national	financial	losses,	was	also	felt	in	international	banking	(Wilson,	2008).
On 15 May 2007, Russian hackers succeeded in disabling Estonia’s national telecommunica-
tions	 information	system,	E-112,	although	while	 the	Estonian	authorities	officially	acknowl-
edged this, Russian authorities refused to admit it (Eneken, et al., 2010: pp 15-34). USA and 
NATO sent teams of computer security experts to help the Estonian authorities cope with the 
massive wave of attacks on operating systems that paralyzed the country’s government web-
sites, banking industry and media. What was of particular interest to computer security experts 
at the time, was that although the cyberattacks only lasted for several weeks, their intensity was 
really high. The coordinated and quickly activities of NATO allies stabilized the cyber security 
in	Estonia.	However,	the	websites	of	the	national	authorities,	the	State	Office	and	the	Federal	
National Election Committee were also targeted by cyber attacks during May 2007. 
The	British	Security	Service,	the	office	of	the	French	Prime	Minister,	and	the	office	of	the	
German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, have all complained to China about cyberattacks on their 
government networks. Merkel has even raised the issue with the Chinese president. So far, no 
official	source	in	China	has	acknowledged	involvement	in	these	cyber	attacks.	
Expert	estimates	showed	that	would	take	several	years	for	the	development	of	classified	infor-
mation equipment and a type of cyber-worm that would be more sophisticated than commer-
cial software, but the estimates were that cyber attacks on operating systems would be suc-
cessful. Those who carried out the cyberattacks on nuclear power plants must have had access 
to	highly	restricted	and	classified	information	systems	and	equipment	(Lewis,	2009:	pp.9-11).
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During 2011, Canadian government reported a major cyberattack against its agencies, includ-
ing Defence Research and Development Canada, a research agency for Canada’s Department 
of National Defense. The attack forced Canada’s main economic agencies, to disconnect from 
the internet. In July 2011, the US Deputy Secretary of Defense stated that a defence contrac-
tor	had	been	hacked	and	24,000	files	from	the	Department	of	Defense	had	been	stolen.	The	
Russian	firm	Kaspersky	discovered	a	worldwide	cyber	attack	dubbed	“Red	October”,	during	
2012 which had been operating since at least 2007. The hackers gathered information through 
vulnerabilities in Microsoft’s Word and Excel programs. The primary targets of the attack 
appeared to be Eastern Europe, the former USSR and Central Asia, although Western Europe 
and North America also reported victims. The virus collected information from government 
Embassies,	 research	 firms,	military	 installations,	 energy	 providers,	 nuclear	 power	 stations	
and	other	critical	infrastructures.	In	2013	the	South	Korean	financial	institutions	came	under	
cyber-attacks, when the Korean broadcaster YTN had their networks infected, in an incident 
said to resemble past cyber efforts by North Korea (Adair, 2009).
Figure 1: History of global cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure1
In a direct cyber-attack, ISIS’ attempted to hack US electrical power companies in October 
2015. In Europe, the most well-known event,  until recently was the Ukrainian power grid 
cyber-attack in December 2015, where attackers hacked the Ukrainian utilities’ networks, 
gained access and manually switched off power to 43 electrical substations. In December 
2016, Ukraine suffered another cyber-attack, this time it was fully automated, as hackers 
struck an electricity transmission station north of the city of Kiev, blacking out a portion 
of	the	Ukrainian	capital	equivalent	to	a	fifth	of	its	total	power	capacity	(Ukrainian	Ministry	
of Energy and Coal, January 2016. http://mpe.kmu.gov.ua/minugol/control/ publish/ article? 
artid= 245 082298).
1  https:is5com.com/uncategorized/nov-22-2017-cyber-immunity-a-holistic-view-for-industrial-control-systems/
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3 Legal Aspects of Cyber-Attacks on Critical 
Infrastructure
Bearing in mind the historical development and perspectives of cyber warfare, what we know 
so far is that the EU, together with NATO, have developed a cyber security strategy, over past 
few years all the NATO and EU members have developed their own national cyber security 
strategies that are in coordination with the European Commission and EU legislation and 
norms for NATO member states (Appazov, 2014: pp 38-42).
From the point of view of international law, the Estonian cyberattack can be described as an 
‘unjust’ cyber-attack. Seen from the perspective of jus ad bellum,	the	attack	lacked	a	sufficient	
just cause, and was not undertaken in any meaningful sense as a last resort. From the perspec-
tive of the just conduct of hostilities – jus in bello – the attack was utterly indiscriminate and 
disproportionate in its threat of harm, at least, when compared either to the harm Russia or 
its citizens were allegedly suffering, or to any legitimate military objective that might have 
otherwise been under consideration. The cyber attack on Estonia led NATO to establish Co-
operative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) in Estonia in May 2008, with a 
staff of 30 specialists. It became operational in August 2008 and is part of a NATO network 
of thirteen accredited Centres of Excellence dedicated to training representatives from NATO 
member countries on “technically sophisticated aspects of NATO operations” (NATO Coop-
erative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence,2018). The CCD COE focus is on coordinating 
cyber defence, and establishing policies for aiding allies during cross-jurisdictional attacks. 
The	European	Union	(EU)	strategy	for	cyber	security	is	based	on	five	principles	that	will	be	
priorities	for	the	future	of	the	EU.	The	EU’s	official	stance	emphasizes	that	cyber	security	is	
just	as	important	as	security	in	physical	space.	In	accordance	with	the	official	text	of	the	EU	
cyber	strategy,	the	most	important	five	principles	are	the	following:	
• Achieving cyber resilience;
• Reducing cybercrime;
• Developing a cyber defence policy and capabilities related to the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP);
• Developing industrial and technological resources for cyber security, and 
• Establishing a coherent international cyberspace policy for the EU, and promoting core 
EU values (European Commission, 2013: pp 4-5).
During 2016 the EU-NATO collaboration began to take shape. At a summit in Warsaw, the 
Presidents of the European Council, the European Commission and NATO’s Secretary Gen-
eral signed a Joint Declaration for better security cooperation between the institutions. The 
Joint Declaration emphasized seven categories for cooperation between NATO and the EU. 
Two were directly applicable to cyber defence: countering hybrid threats, and cyber security 
and defence (EU-NATO cooperation – Factsheet, 2019).
The last decade’s developments in digital information technology have dramatically increased 
interdependencies between the critical infrastructures. Energy infrastructure provides essen-
tial fuel to all other critical infrastructure sectors, as without energy, none of them can operate 
properly. In turn, it depends on other critical infrastructure sectors, such as communications 
and	information	technology.	The	image	above	provides	a	simplified	illustration	of	the	inter-
dependencies between 16 critical infrastructure sectors, including the four critical sectors (i.e. 
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energy, water, communications, and transportation) that provide lifeline functions to all other 
critical infrastructure sectors.
Figure 2: Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies2
Electricity, as part of critical infrastructure, provides essential power to the communication, 
transportation, water sectors and in return subsectors rely on them for fuel delivery 
(transportation), electricity generation (water for production and cooling), as well as the 
control and operation of infrastructure (communication), (Lindstrom, 2019: pp 37-41). 
The EU Task Force in cooperation with NATO developed three phases for strengthening the 
EU’s cyber defence capabilities as follows: 
• Base Case: implementing the 2017 Cyber Security Package;
• Cyber Security Strategy from 2018;
• Establishing a Cyber Defence Coordinator; 
• Creating a Cyber Defence Agency.
The	final	goal	was	to	create	the	Cyber	Defence	Agency.		This	was	carried	out	in	five	stages:
• The implementation of the NATO and EU Cyber Security Package from 2017, according 
to the EU Cyber Strategy from 2018, and the Cyber Defence Policy Framework;
• The creation of a Cyber Defence Coordinator, in coordination with the European Agency 
for Cyber Security (ENISA), the EU Council, and the European Commission, alongside 
other agencies such as the EDA; 
• Under the guidance of the Coordinator and through prominent collaboration with indus-
try, the implementation of a series of cooperation-oriented tasks that would lead to the 
development of a technical attribution forum; 
• Under the guidance of the Coordinator, the investigation and drafting of a mandate for a 
governance model for a Cyber Defence Agency Stage; 
2  Critical Infrastructure Protection: Prevention, detection, response and mitigation of the combination of physical 
and cyber threats to the critical infrastructure of the Europe Project: H2020–CIP-01-2016–740898
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• The creation of a Cyber Defence Agency that encompasses the coordinating functions 
of the Coordinator, ENISA’s advisory capacity developed under the 2017 package, and 
specific,	core	executive	functions	(Scheffer,	2018:	pp	65-67).
During 2019, the European Commission gave its recommendations to (ENISA) for the cyber 
security of modern 5G networks. This toolbox includes:
• An inventory of the types of security risks that can affect the cyber security of 5G net-
works (e.g. supply chain risk, software vulnerability risk, access control risk, risks arising 
from the legal and policy framework to which suppliers of information and communica-
tions technologies equipment may be subject in third countries);
•	 A	set	of	possible	mitigating	measures	(e.g.	third-party	certification	for	hardware,	software	
or services, formal hardware and software tests or conformity checks, processes to ensure 
access controls exist and are enforced, identifying products, services or suppliers that 
are considered potentially not secure, etc.). These measures should address every type 
of	security	risk	identified	in	one	or	more	Member	States	following	the	risk	assessment.	
The Member States of the EU, together with the European Commission, should identify 
the conditions concerning the security of public networks against unauthorized access, 
to be attached to general authorization and security requirements for networks and for 
the purposes of commitments participating in procedures for granting rights of use of the 
spectrum in 5G bands pursuant to Directive 2002/20/EC. The EU Member States should 
cooperate	with	European	Commission	to	develop	specific	security	requirements	that	could	
apply in the context of public procurement related to 5G networks. This should include 
mandatory	requirements	to	implement	cyber	security	certification	schemes	in	public	pro-
curement, insofar as such schemes are not yet binding for all suppliers and operators. EU 
Members should cooperate with the European Commission to assess the effects of this 
recommendation by 1 October 2020, with a view to determining appropriate ways forward 
(European Commission. Cyber security of 5G networks, 2019: pp 7-8). This assessment 
should take into account the outcome of the coordinated European Union risk assessment 
from cyber threats.
4 Conclusion
Critical infrastructure (CI) systems will continue to depend on information systems and 
electronic data. Reliance on the power grid and telecommunications will also continue to 
increase, as will the number of attack vectors and the attack surface, due to the complexity of 
these systems and higher levels of connectivity due to smart networks. The security of these 
systems	and	data	is	vital	to	public	confidence	and	safety (Dell Annual Threat Report, 2015). 
Cyber-attacks and sabotage of critical infrastructures are threats which are present both now 
and in the future. In the future we will observe an increase in attacks on data brokers, physical 
infrastructures, and telecommunication networks, such as global denial of service attacks on 
all connected services. New forms of CI, such as social media platforms, will become a prime 
target for cybercriminals (Kaspersky and Critical Infrastructure Protection, 2015). Exploitation 
of existing vulnerabilities, “zero day attacks” (days without attacks), and targeted phishing 
attacks will increase and continue to pose threats against critical infrastructures, owing to the 
complex mix of legacy systems and new components, combined with the need to minimize 
business disruption and cost, which often delays upgrades and updates. A lack of supplier 
support	 and	 policies	 also	 has	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 the	 security	 of	 CI.	 Employees	with	
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privileged system access will remain key targets and subject to social engineering attacks 
(Report on Cyber security and Critical Infrastructure in the USA, 2015). Strengthening cyber 
security requires a combination of prevention, detection, incident mitigation, and investigation. 
Addressing the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures necessitates a cooperative approach 
from the public and private sectors, and connection between the local and the international 
dimensions. The challenge of protecting critical infrastructures requires the management of 
competing demands between security and privacy (Report on Destructive Cyber-Attacks Blitz 
Critical Infrastructure, 2015). Almost half of security professionals think that a successful 
cyberattack will take down critical infrastructure and cause the loss of human life within the 
next three years (Critical Infrastructure Readiness Report, Aspen institute, 2015).One of the 
three most powerful states in the world, the United States, through its government, sponsored 
website Cyber Seekers, constantly advertises cyber security job openings in the United States. 
New roles and jobs in cyber security arise beyond the typical job roles. More interactive 
information, knowledge and shared experience can be found on the US National Initiative 
for Cyber Security Education (NICE) website (see below). With the rapid development of 
information technology, it is more than necessary for both government and private sector 
employees	 to	be	educated	and	 trained	 in	 the	field	of	cyber	attack	management,	and	 in	 the	
implementation of appropriate legal regulations and mechanisms for legal protection and 
cyber-attack sanctions.
In 2013, NATO’s Computer Incident Response Centre (NCIRC) upgrade project from 58 
million EUR for enhancement of NATO cyber defence. This major capability will help NATO 
better protect its networks from the increasing number of cyber-attacks against the Alliance’s 
information systems.
As an initial example to other world states, the US government established the National 
Institute for Cyber Security Education (NICE). Together with the Department of Education 
and other agencies, NICE launched a four-pronged strategy to build a cyber secure nation 
through training, awareness, post-graduate educational programmes and development 
for federal security professionals. To meet this goal, NICE targeted a broad range of the 
population as prospective employees: including students and private sector partners (USA 
National Cyber Strategy, 2018: pp 5-8).
Cyber security reform legislation should make these arrangements permanent. Government 
agencies should be given the authority and resources to initiate new recruitment and education 
campaigns, and to extend the scope of the existing ones. Firstly, more cyber security will be 
needed to manage the increase in connectivity, so there will be an increase in demand for 
cyber security jobs. Secondly, through enhancing its presence in recruitment and education, 
the federal government could attract individuals to take part in these cyber security jobs who 
might otherwise have joined the ranks of Anonymous or other hacker groups. Granted, people 
who are anti-government or even apathetic towards government may not be persuaded by 
the government’s recruitment efforts, but for those young people who exhibit exceptional 
computer skills and seek a community which utilizes and appreciates these skills, the 
recruitment and education campaigns will certainly aid governments in this mission.
The need for cyber security professionals is increasing day by day. The driving factors for this 
are: the increasing number of useful internet and social networks, the use of smartphones, and 
the	electronic	commerce	of	most	financial	and	industrial	corporations	among	other	things.	All	
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of this increases the interest in cyber-attacks on information systems and networks, especially 
in	large	financial	and	industrial	corporations,	whose	functionality	as	been	negatively	affected	
not only at a national but also at a regional level, especially in the most powerful states in 
the world which, for example: exports electricity, natural gas and petroleum products. Many 
scientific	papers	point	out	that	there	is	a	shortage	of	staff,	especially	for	high-quality	cyber	
security professionals.
NATO is setting up a new Cyber Operations Centre in Mons, Belgium. The Centre will be 
fully operational by 2023 and will support military commanders with situational awareness to 
inform operations and missions and strengthen NATO’s cyber defence. The centre will also 
coordinate NATO’s operational activity in cyberspace, ensuring the freedom to act in this 
domain and making NATO operations more resilient to cyber-attacks (nato.int/nato_static_
fl2014/assets//	 pdf_2019_02/2019	 0208_1902	 cyber-defence-en.pdf). The International 
Information	System	Security	Certification	Consortium	(IISSCC)	has	made	the	final	analysis	
for the workforce needed for better cyber security.  The cyber security workforce gap by 2022 
is on pace to hit 1.8 million experts. (USA National Initiative for Cyber security Careers and 
Studies, 2017). 
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Denis Čaleta
Rising to the global security challenges calls for coordinated and effective responses. 
Terrorism, the radicalization of individuals and groups, and the risks posed by the cyber 
environment involve serious threats to the continued operation of critical infrastruc-
ture. The introduction of new technologies further increases the complexity of the en-
vironment in which critical infrastructure operates. This book gives some of the an-
swers we need for the future in order to be even more effective in preventing these 
socially deviant acts. Through its activities, the Republic of Slovenia adds its part of 
energy, knowledge and experience to the international mosaic designed to ensure na-
tional and international security. It will be difficult to overcome all the accumulated 
challenges in a short period of time, so the awareness of the importance of long-term 
and continual efforts is crucial for achieving the expected success. Our commitment to 
preserving all the democratic and technological gains of our age will also have a sig-
nificant impact on the further development of effective measures directed towards 
ensuring the security and stability of our society.
Matej Tonin MA
Minister of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia
Terrorism has claimed innocent lives for thousands of years. We saw it evolve to great-
er levels of violence and lethality in the 21st century, and it will undoubtedly remain a 
threat to peace and freedom for the foreseeable future. As they have in the past, the 
enemies of civilization continue to expand their methods to disrupt our way of life, 
seeking targets on which we all depend such as our financial systems and information 
and communications technology.  Our age is also characterized by a growing reliance 
on automation. Cybersecurity is central to security and resilience of critical infrastruc-
ture. Nations throughout Europe and the Western Balkans have made significant in-
vestments to protect critical systems and ensure our militaries and governments main-
tain an advantage in the cyber domain. We must remain vigilant.  Our adversaries seek 
new asymmetric ways to exploit cyber vulnerabilities and attack critical information 
and communications systems. This Regional Defense Fellowship Program book is an 
important examination of the issues all nations face.
Lynda C. Blanchard
U.S. Ambassador to Slovenia
Modern security processes present significant challenges. In the field of protection of 
critical infrastructure, these challenges are increasingly related to the risks of the cy-
ber environment. Adding to this framework the human potential, which has been ne-
glected in the recent period, specifically because of the development of new technolo-
gies in the area of artificial intelligence, two important segments stand out; they are 
addressed in this book. The radicalization of individuals or wider social groups, and the 
associated cyber risks in the modern information society, can significantly affect the 
smooth and uninterrupted operation of those procedural and technological capabilities 
that fall under critical infrastructure. These are of key importance for the functioning of 
individual sectors and for the proper functioning of the wider community. Success in 
counteracting these complex security phenomena relating to the protection of critical 
infrastructure can be ensured through appropriate cooperation of all the involved enti-
ties within the public and private environments. 
Blaž Košorok
State Secretary Ministry of Infrastructure of the Republic of Slovenia
